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Visitors' Refusal To Leave Premises
Joseph Gibson '
"WHAT SHOULD WE DO? The visitors are causing trouble and they
will not leave!" Today, people are confronted with this problem on
a regular basis.' Welfare offices, public buildings, college campuses,
shopping centers, and private businessmen are faced with the prob-
lem of how to handle the unwanted visitor la
Many factors have been blamed for this new, brazen attitude of
remaining on another's property. Some fault the Supreme Court's
rulings in Brown v. Louisiana,lb where court conviction of sit-in dem-
onstrators at a public library, was reversed by holding that the
conviction was a violation of the fourteenth amendment rights, and
Cox v. Louisiana' where the Court decided that a state statute which
regulated picketing was improper because of the discretion which
it gave to local officials. Others lay the blame on a more permissive
society which is breeding contempt for the power structure. The most
logical explanation is a growing attempt to know and interpret what
the Constitution means and what freedoms are enshrined in America
today. The purpose of this paper, however, is not to examine the
causes, but rather to examine what has been done with the people
involved and under what theories.
The method used in the past was simply to throw the trespasser
off the property. The only restraint was that the owner should use
only whatever force was reasonably necessary.3 The solutions today
have lost this early simplicity and must be looked upon with concern.
Trespass Based On Race
The question of constitutionality in some cases has been a prob-
lem.4 The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 gave much concern
to those people who used race as grounds to have someone thrown
off their property. Many lower court decisions which upheld this
right were later reversed as unconstitutional because of the racial
aspect.5 Once the judicial interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 became known, violations of this nature became minimal, and
*B.B.A., Kent State University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State University Col-
lege of Law.
'Comment, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1773 (1967).
la Comment, Right to Picket on Quasi-Public Property, 25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 53
(1969) ; Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping Centers, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 250 (1969).
lb Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
2 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth, 211 Ala. 268, 100 So. 240 (1924).
4 Meany, Constitutional Lac--Civil Rights Demonstrations-Trespass Statutes, 18 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1396 (1967).
Lombard v. Louisiana, 241 La. 958, 132 So.2d 860 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 267 (1963)
Gober v. City of Birmingham, 41 Ala. App. 313, 133 So.2d 697 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S.
374 (1963) ; Blow v. North Carolina, 261 N.C. 463, 135 S.E.2d 14; 261 N.C. 467, 135
S.E.2d 17, vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 684 (1965).
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the lower courts began to follow the precedent. Consequently, the
requesting of someone to leave based on race and their subsequent
refusal to do so, is no longer held to be an action which is punishable
as trespass. 6 Today, the appellate courts look to the reasoning behind
the request to leave, 7 and will overrule a lower court conviction for
trespass or disturbing the peace which is founded solely on racial
discrimination.8 Laymen are beginning to realize the consequences
surrounding their forcing someone off the premises because of color.
The area of growing concern is what to do with someone whose pres-
ence is no longer wanted because of his activities.
Trespass Based On Activities
Trespass is most often committed by the refusal to leave. In
Oettint'eiv. Stewart,9 the court said:
A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in pos-
session of another without a privilege to do so created by pos-
sessor's consent or otherwise. 10
The Restatement of Torts points out:
If the possessor of the land has consented to the actor's presence
on the land, his failure to leave after the expiration of the license
is a trespass."
These positions are part of a basic understanding that refusal to
leave another's property upon his request gives cause for trespass
or other similar offenses.
The private owner has not met the resistance from the courts as
has the public property owner, but his position does remain dependent
on warning to leave and the type of entrance. He can also be charged
criminally if he exerts too much force in removing a trespasser from
his property.
12
Illegal entrance and intent to trespass have been proof of criminal
trespass for many years and are looked upon as sufficient grounds
to uphold a trespass conviction. The problem lies, therefore, in deter-
mining how legal entry becomes trespass.
Trespass And Legal Entry
Legal entry onto private property can be upheld based on implied
or direct consent. Shopping centers which have numerous businesses
are considered to be open to the public for such purposes as passing
6 Civil Rights Act, 4-2 U.S.C.A. § 2000 (a) (1964).
7Hartfield v. Mississippi, 367 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1966).
8 State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 136 S.E.2d 674 (1964).
o Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19 (1944).
10 Id. at 136, 148 P.2d at 20.
nRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158(b) (1965).
12 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (3rd. ed. 1964).
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out handbills.13 A Sears store, however, was determined to be private
property, and refusal to leave made union organizers guilty of tres-
pass. 4 Unlawful entry was not necessary to prosecute for trespass
when union pickets refused to leave a discount food operation after
receiving request to leavei'5 The refusal to grant permission to allow
pickets at Newark Airport Eastern Airlines office made picketers
guilty of trespass when they would not leave on the manager's
request. 16 Entry in all of these cases was legal, based on the type of
business present.
The Michigan courts saw fit to uphold a lower court conviction
where the defendants were creating disturbances in a bank by sitting
in front of tellers' windows. The court said that sidewalks and streets
were public property, but the inside of businesses was not, and the
owners had the right to request that protestors leave the premises.17
In a similar case, the California courts held that public invitation
to enter a public place was immaterial where there was an obvious
plan on the part of the defendants to disrupt operations. In this case,
the entry into the bank was the prohibitive conduct needed to fulfill
the statute since there was an obvious plan to disrupt. Had this not
been true, the original consent to enter could not have been termin-
ated retroactively.1 8
In the preceding cases, the main point was one of the protestors'
refusal to leave upon request; the original entry had the appearance
of unauthorized entry since the intentions were against the interests
of the owner. The question remains, what of the entry which is of
no consequence to the owner, but later becomes offensive?
Trespass And Offensive Conduct
In Rager v. McCloskeyg, a deputy sheriff entered law offices on offi-
cial business. When he could not find the party in question, he became
abusive and was asked to leave. His refusal to leave was held as
trespass.19 When a gambling casino customer became abusive, he was
asked to leave and refused. The court said that unauthorized entry and
refusal to leave are of equal consequence when construing the tres-
pass statute.2 0 In a different situation, a woman had attempted to
steal some dresses by taking them into the dressing room and conceal-
ing them on her person. A store detective became suspicious, inves-
tigated, and arrested her. No search and seizure violations were pres-
13 State v. Miller, 280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968).
14 People v. Goduto, 21 I1l.2d 605, 174- N.E.2d 395 (1961).
15 South Discount Food Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1552, 14 Ohio Misc. 188, 235
N.E.2d 143 (1968).
16 State v. Kirk, 84 N.J. Super 151, 201 A.2d 102 (1964).
17 People v. Weinberg, 6 Mich. App. 345, 14-9 N.W.2d 248 (1967).
18 People v. Brown, 236 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 915, 47 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1965).
10 Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214 (1953).
20 Scott v. Justice's Court, 84 Nev. 9, 435 P.2d 747 (1968).
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ent since one who enters the property of another as an invitee or
licensee becomes a trespasser once it is shown that the purpose of
entry was for the commission of a criminal offense against the
owner.2 ' A group of people who wished to see the Cardinal of the
Archdiocese of Chicago decided to conduct a sit-in on the sixth floor,
all of which was rented by the Archdiocese. This was held as trespass
since this was private property, and their refusal to leave upon re-
quest made the people trespassers as of that time.
22
The private homeowner and small businessman have been pro-
tected against legal entry which later has offensive results.
Two young boys, 7 and 8 years old, were trespassers, though there
was restricted or conditional consent given to their entry onto a
property, when they started a fire in a garage, thereby exceeding
the consent. 23 A home builder who had filed a mechanic's lien on the
home of a customer was allowed by the owner to enter the premises,
but the court said that he could be deemed a trespasser if he acted
in an unreasonable manner while exercising his privilege to enter the
property.24
The private property owner's right to have offensive persons who
refuse to leave arrested for trespass was not upheld by the New
York courts in People v. Lawson, where a person entered a real estate
office for the purposes of signing a lease. Before he had done so, a
second person entered the office. At this time, the first person de-
manded that the lease be offered to the second person. The owner
demanded that both parties leave, but they refused to do so. The
court held that this was not an intrusion on property since there was
no unauthorized entry present.25 It appears however, that the majority
of cases would agree with the dissent, which felt that remaining on
the premises after having been ordered lawfully to vacate gave suf-
ficient grounds for conviction.
Private property still maintains the degree of privacy it has had,
and unless an infringement on civil rights is present, the courts will
enforce the right to tell people to leave. A subsequent refusal to leave
will give rise to trespass charges. Public property, however, enters
into the area of a person's right to be on the property and not having
to leave. This is looked upon in a different vein.
Trespass of Public Property
Public officials are concerned with ensuring that arrests for
refusal to leave public property will not be overruled as being un-
constitutional. It is for this reason that many public offices have
21 City of University Heights v. Conley, 20 Ohio Misc. 112, 252 N.E.2d 198 (1969).
2 City of Chicago v. Rosser, 47 111.2d 10, 264 N.E.2d 158 (1970).
23 Brown v. Dellinger, 355 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
24 Pedi v. Jagiencarz, 25 111. App. 2d 467, 167 N.E.2d 447 (1960).
25 people v. Lawson, 16 N.Y.2d 552, 260 N.Y.S.2d 661, 208 N.E.2d 459 (1965).
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adopted policies for their own protection. The Cuyahoga County wel-
fare office in 'Cleveland, Ohio, has adopted policies allowing people
to remain in the building until 11:00 P.M., though offices close at
5:00 P.M.25a Until recent years, a policy such as this would have been
absurd rather than commonplace, as the trend of case law seems to
indicate.
Adderley v. Florida was a major test of the right of public officials
to prosecute people for trespass when they refuse to leave public
property on which they claim a right to remain under the first and
fourteenth amendments. The Supreme Court, Justice Black delivering
the opinion, said that the jail property on which the protestors were
demonstrating was within the control of the sheriff, and that he could
arrest them for trespass after ordering them to disperse. The Court
felt that.the constitutional issues which Adderley claimed had been
violated were- not, in fact, violated by this arrest. The Court held that
the United States constitution does not prohibit a. state from con-
trolling its own property as long as it does so in a non-discriminatory
manner.26
. The reasoning which the Supreme Court utilized in Adderlcy has
been used to prosecute other "public" property trespasses. A sit-in
demonstration at a police station in an attempt to meet with the
police commissioner was held to be a trespass.2 7 A protestor in a
welfare office was found guilty of trespass charges, though he felt
he had business to attend in the office. The court said that it was up
to 'reasonable men to determine if he had a valid business reason to
be. there.2 8 The refusal to leave a public building at 6:00 A.M. was
held sufficient to convict a person of trespass who was talking to
inductees in the armed services about their rights and the Vietnam
War. 29 The question of the first and fourteenth amendments being
violated was dispelled in another case where a federal district court
held that physical presence in a building which is dedicated to
specific public uses other than that of a public thoroughfare (Here
a welfare office was the setting for a demonstration.), though this
presence is for the purpose of communicating ideas, is not pure
speech and not protected by the constitution, and is thus a trespass. 30
The renovation by a group of clergymen of a slum dwelling
owned by urban renewal, and their subsequent occupancy in the
house was a trespass because the clergymen refused to leave the
25a Telephone interview with Thomas Romcea, Office Manager, Cuyahoga County Welfare
- Office, Cleveland, Ohio, on October 12, 1971.
26 Adderley v. Florida, 395 U.S. 39 (1966).
27 People v. Martinez, 43 Mise.2d 94, 250 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1964).
8 Parrish v. Municipal Court, 258 Cal. App. 497, 65 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1968).
29 Commonwealth v. Egleson, 355 Mass. 259, 244 N.E.2d 589 (1969).
30 Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd sub nor. Doyle v. O'Brien,
396 U.S. 297 (1970).
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property on request.31 A sit-in at city council chambers was held to be
trespass, since public property was designated to be the land of another
within the meaning of the trespass statute.
3 2
These cases uphold the public officials' right to make an arrest for
trespass when they feel the need to do so. The majority of jurisdictions
agree with this right. However, two recent cases indicate a new
manner of thought which may well be a sign of the times when one
remembers that the Supreme Court decision in Adderley was a 5 to 4
decision.33
Constitutional Applications To Trespass
A California case held that distribution of leaflets against the
Vietnam War and the refusal to leave the Los Angeles Union Station
upon request were not sufficient grounds to arrest for disturbing the
peace. The opinion, written by Justice Traynor, stated that the de-
fendants were within their rights by remaining where they were,
since first amendment freedoms could not be infringed upon, as the
lower courts had felt, on the premise that their actions in the terminal
were not in the interest of the terminal.34 The idea that public prop-
erty could be deemed private property for purposes of the enforcement
of trespass and similar offenses was questioned in State v. Hanapole.
Here, protestors were at Columbia (South Carolina) Metropolitan
Airport awaiting President Nixon and carrying packages and signs
which they refused to give to local officials on request. They were
then told to leave, and refused again. Their subsequent conviction of
trespass was reversed, based on the grounds that the trespass statute
applied only to private property, not to publicly owned airport
property. Thus, the statute could not be applied to public property. 35
These two cases indicate a leaning toward the extension of the
first and fourteenth amendment privileges. The majority of cases still
allow public officials to control their own property, but whether it
will remain so is questionable.
Schools and Public Property Trespasses
Today, the focal point of much dissent is on our college campuses
and in public schools. These institutions have not escaped the protest
marches, sit-ins, and trespass offenses. School officials have been
forced to test the court's interpretation of trespass statutes, which
make the refusal to leave after a warning the basis for arrest. State
legislators in Ohio have enacted measures which they feel will alle-
31 People v. Johnson, 16 Mich. App. 745, 168 N.W.2d 913 (1969).
32 City of Athens v. Bromall, 20 Ohio App.2d 140, 252 N.E.2d 298 (1969).
33 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).34In re Hoffman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353 (1967).
35 State v. Hanapole, 178 S.E.2d 247 (S.C. 1970).
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viate some of the campus problems, but its effect on trespass prob-
lems remains in question.35a
In one case, students, who were in a building on the Berkeley
campus, were guilty of trespass, since failure to leave public buildings
after request to do so was not protected by the constitution.36 Public
school grounds were designated to be the property of another in
accordance with the statute used to prosecute a person who had
entered high school grounds without good cause and refused to leave
at the request of the principal. 37 College students who were protesting,
in a campus building, the presence of Marines at Career Carnival
Day at the University of Michigan were asked to leave. They refused
and were convicted of trespass for refusing to leave upon request.
Officials had advised them to leave the signs and pamphlets outside,
after which they were welcome to return. On appeal, the conviction
was reversed because the "trespass after warning statute" calls for
the owners or occupiers of the premises to object to certain indivi-
duals, which was not the case here in view of the fact that the people
in question were able to return without signs and pamphlets.38 This
decision was in turn reversed and conviction reinstated with the court
pointing out that signs and pamphlets were "red herrings," and only
clouded the issue, which was whether or not the defendants refused
to leave upon request. The court held that they did.39
A similar case was decided in Kentucky, the court saying that
a student at the University of Kentucky, who was protesting the
presence of Defense Intelligence Agency recruiting, was guilty of
trespass for refusing to leave upon request.4 0 Though he had been
legally admitted earlier that day, the court said:
The privilege of an enrolled student to use and occupy the prop-
erty of a school is and should be subject to the will of its govern-
ing authorities. If he is told to stay out of a particular room, build-
ing or familiar trysting place, he enters it as a trespasser. Like-
wise, if he is directed to leave it he remains as a trespasser.
41
The Illinois courts, following other states, recently decided that
a school teacher, who was given his letter of dismissal and refused
to leave, was guilty of trespass for his failure to do so. The court held
that he had sufficient time with which to gather his belongings and
his refusal to act made him guilty of criminal trespass. 42
35aRowland, Colleges and Uni'verities-Effect of House Bill No. 1219 on Controlling
Camtus Disorders, 32 OHIO STATE L. REv. 198 (1971).
361n re Bacon, 240 Cal. App.2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966).
27 Kitchens v. State, 221 Ga. 839, 14-7 S.E.2d 509 (1966).
38 People v. Harrison, 13 Mich. App. 54, 163 N.W.2d 699 (1968).
39 People v. Harrison, 383 Mich. 585, 178 N.W.2d 650 (1970).
40 O'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
411 d at 157.
4: People v. Spencer, 268 N.E.2d 192 (Il. Ct. App. 1971).
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The New Jersey courts have looked upon peaceful protestors as
being within their rights and not punishable as trespassers. In one
case, a teacher was conducting a silent protest in an area of the school
parking lot and was not interfering with school activities. The teacher
refused to leave on request and the court supported him, saying that
mere entry on school property was not punishable as trespass since
it was public property. 43
The preceding cases have dealt with public property where the
trespasser's initial presence was encouraged by the property owner.
What of the person who enters onto property for his own benefit and
then refuses to leave? Does the court look upon him with the same
jaundiced eye?
Trespass By Licensee
An early Georgia case found a gardener who was hired for three
years, but discharged after one year's service, to be a trespasser when
he refused to leave the living quarters provided him by the employer.
44
A salesman who was selling a fly spraying device was told to leave
the premises. Instead, he proceeded to demonstrate the machine and
caused injury to the parties present. The court found him to be a
trespasser, since his acts overstepped his original license.45 In Penn-
sylvania, a rightful entry proved to be a valid defense against an
action for trespass where a gas company had an easement across prop-
erty and had entered this property in order to fix the gas line. How-
ever, the court granted leave to amend their complaint from trespass
to assumpsit, adding that this was entirely due to the peculiarities
of Pennsylvania rules of civil procedure. 46 An interesting situation
led to rather questionable results in Northern State Power Co. v.
Franklin, where an easement had been obtained to erect an electric
transmission line. The line was constructed on the wrong section of
property and a subsequent property owner requested the removal
of the structure. The court held that consent to construction on one
section is not consent for another and, where the land owner will
allow entry on the land to remove the structure, the refusal to remove
the structure, rather than the original entry, will support a charge
of trespass.47
The licensee is on no firmer ground than the visitor. He must
respond to the wishes of the owner and leave upon request. The type
of warning needed to compel the intruder to leave the property must
be examined since most cases require that a request to leave be made
in order to support the trespass conviction. What type of warning
must be given?
43 State v. Besson, 110 N.J. Super. 528, 266 A.2d 175 (1970).
44 Mackenzie v. Minis, 132 Ga. 323, 63 S.E. 900 (1909).
45 Brabazon v. Joannes Bros. Co., 231 Wis. 426, 286 N.W. 21 (1939).
4r Gedekoh v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 183 Pa. Super. 511, 133 A.2d 283 (1957).
47 Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 122 N.W.2d 26 (1963).
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Warnings- To Intruders
The intruder should be asked to leave by someone who has the
authority to do so. In State v. Clyburn, the North Carolina court felt
that refusal to leave after being asked to do so made the defendants
trespassers ab initio 48 Ohio has held that the status of business invitee
can be changed to that of a trespasser in a case where the visitor re-
mained on the land after a request to leave was given by the owner
of the property. The court pointed out that any other decision would
be -ridiculous considering how helpless a businessman would be if,
at closing time, a customer refused to leave.4 9 Once the order to leave
is ignored, the business invitee becomes a trespasser.
The manner in which the warning is given, and the way in which
the warning is worded is also of importance. In a situation- where the
warning was given to an entire group of people and one person re-
mained, the court upheld a conviction since the offender was part of
the group; therefore the group warning to leave was sufficient.50 In
another case, a group announcement to leave stockyards, followed by
a personal request from the sheriff, provided sufficient grounds to
make an arrest when a number of people refused to leave.51 A fifteen-
year-old was convicted of trespass when she returned to a store from
which, three months earlier, she had been evicted. In this case, a New
York court interpreted the trespass statute to have been violated by
unlawful entry or remaining after an order to leave.5 2 This decision
was reversed by New York's highest court with the reasoning
that a mere reading of the trespass statute was insufficient to con-
stitute lawful order not to enter the premises; a specific order not
to return is necessary in order for there to be a violation." Another
decision from New York reversed a lower court conviction for tres-
pass which had been based on the defendant's entrance into a real
estate office and request for money.5 4 The decision stated that since
the entrance was lawful
... a conviction could be had only if the prosecution established
that (1) a lawful order not to remain was personally communi-
cated to the defendant and (2) that he defied such a lawful order. 55
Here, no previous warning had been given and no trespass conviction
could be upheld.
The consensus from the case studies emphasizes one point quite
graphically. That is, a proper warning must be given to the offender
before he is removed from the premises. An improper warning, or one
49 State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).
49 State v. Carriker, 5 Ohio App.2d 255, 214 N.E.2d 809 (1964).
50 Clemons v. City of Birmingham, 277 Ala. 447, 171 So.2d 456 (1965).
51 State v. Quinnell, 277 Minn. 63, 151 N.W.2d 98 (1967).
52 In re D., 58 Misc.2d 1093, 296 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1968).
53 In re D., 33 App. Div.2d 1028, 308 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1970).
54 People w: Brown, 25 N.Y.2d 374, 254 N.E.2d 755 (1969).
55 Id. at 377, 254 N.E.2d 757.
Jan. 1972
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
REFUSAL TO LEAVE
which does not let the offender know exactly what is meant, may lead
to the dismissal of the action to prosecute for trespass. After the warn-
ing is given, reasonably necessary force can be used to remove the
trespasser.
In Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth. 56 the Alabama court held
that:
[w]hile the entry by one person on the premises of another may
be lawful, by reason of express or implied invitation to enter, his
failure to depart, on the request of owner, will make him a tres-
passer and justify the owner in using reasonable force to eject
him.5 7
In this case, reasonable force was held to be a pistol whipping and
a hole shot in the trespasser's pants. While this appears rather harsh,
the philosophy remains the same today, though our interpretation of
reasonable force has mellowed over the years.
Injured Third Parties During Forcible Ejectments
In a tort action alleging a bar owner's scuffle with a customer as
being the cause of a third party's injuries, the court found no proxi-
mate cause. In its reasoning, the court said that the bar owner had
the right to evict an unmannerly customer and certainly had no way
of knowing that the latter would shoot anyone.58 Another bar owner
case involved the physical removal of a patron and his subsequent
injury by another customer. When the injured party sued the owner
and assaultor as joint tortfeasors, the court decided that an owner
could revoke the license he had extended and remove the customer
bodily, and was not personally liable for the subsequent injuries
where he had no knowledge of the intent of the assaultor.5 9 A shooting
in the foot with a shotgun after refusal to leave a parking lot was
held to be reasonable force in a 1967 decision.60 When an owner told
a customer to leave his property after it became evident that he in-
tended to try to kill another customer, the court upheld the business-
man's right to kill the offending customer when he came at the owner
with a knife despite an available escape route. 61 The court extended
the exception to the retreat doctrine to include the "place of business
of the person attacked 62" In other words, a businessman need not
try to escape before using whatever force necessary to defend him-
self.
56 Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth, 211 Ala. 268, 100 So. 240 (1924).
57 Id. at 270, 100 So. at 241.5 t Polando v. Vizzini, 58 Ohio L. Abs. 466, 97 N.E.2d 59 (1949).
9 Ramirez v. Chavez, 71 Ariz. 239, 226 P.2d 143 (1951).
60 Silas v. Bowen, 277 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1967).
61 Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).
19 Id. at 491, 263 A.2d at 380.
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Conclusion
Trespassing, disturbing the peace, and similar offenses have
plagued man throughout the years and no future utopian solution
appears available. The courts have stood fast on the violations but
their interpretation of the law is slowly changing. The prerequisites
needed to have trespass when the entrance onto the property is legal
have broadened so as to necessitate a great deal of concern on the
part of the property owner. The property owner must now be sure
he has given full consideration to his actions and those of the offend-
ing person before charging the visitor with trespass. Caution is the
key word when you want to say, "Get out!"
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